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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate physical-layer security for a heterogeneous cellular network consisting
of a macro cell and a small cell in the presence of a passive eavesdropper that intends to tap both
the macro-cell and small-cell transmissions. Both the orthogonal spectrum sharing (OSS) and non-
orthogonal spectrum sharing (NOSS) are considered for the heterogeneous cellular network. The OSS
allows the macro cell and small cell to access a given spectrum band in an orthogonal manner, whereas
the NOSS enables them to access the same spectrum simultaneously and mutual interference exits. As
a consequence, we present two NOSS schemes, namely the interference-limited NOSS (IL-NOSS) and
interference-canceled NOSS (IC-NOSS), where the mutual interference is constrained below a tolerable
level in the IL-NOSS through power control and the IC-NOSS scheme exploits a specially-designed
signal for canceling out the interference received a legitimate cellular user while confusing the passive
eavesdropper. We derive closed-form expressions for an overall secrecy outage probability of the OSS,
IL-NOSS, and IC-NOSS schemes, which take into account the transmission secrecy of both the macro
cell and small cell. We further characterize the secrecy diversity of OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS
schemes through an asymptotic secrecy outage analysis in the high signal-to-noise ratio region. It is
shown that the OSS and IL-NOSS methods obtain the same secrecy diversity gain of zero only, and
a higher secrecy diversity gain of one is achieved by the IC-NOSS scheme. Additionally, numerical
results demonstrate that the IC-NOSS scheme significantly performs better than the OSS and IL-NOSS
methods in terms of the overall secrecy outage probability.
Index Terms
Physical-layer security, heterogeneous cellular networks, secrecy outage probability, secrecy diver-
sity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by an explosive increase of wireless data traffic, dense small base stations with low
power are deployed in a macro cell to increase the network capacity and accommodate more user
terminals [1]-[4]. Such a network architecture is termed as the heterogeneous cellular network,
where a macro cell typically coexists with various small cells, e.g., femto cells, pico cells and
micro cells [5]. In heterogeneous cellular networks, a number of economical small base stations
(SBSs) are generally deployed around a relatively expensive macro base station (MBS), which
can expand the network capacity and coverage at a reduced expense [6], [7]. Meanwhile, there
are also some challenging issues to be addressed for heterogeneous cellular networks, including
the user association, resource allocation and interference management [8]-[10]. For example, the
authors of [11] studied energy efficiency and load balancing for the user association problem,
and proposed an energy conservation algorithm for energy-efficient transmissions. In [12], a
load-balancing scheme was presented for addressing the association between subscribers and
available wireless local area networks (WLANs).
Typically, both the orthogonal and non-orthogonal spectrum sharing may be considered for
heterogeneous cellular networks, where a number of small cells are in the range of macro cells
[13]. In the orthogonal spectrum sharing mechanism, a given spectrum band of heterogeneous
networks is first divided into a series of orthogonal sub-bands, which are then allocated to the
macro cells and small cells, respectively. In other words, the macro cells and small cells are
allowed to exclusively occupy their respective sub-bands, which is referred to as orthogonal
spectrum sharing (OSS). By contrast, the non-orthogonal spectrum sharing (NOSS) enables
SBSs and MBSs to simultaneously access the same spectrum, also called non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) in [14], [15]. As discussed in existing literature [14]-[18], the NOSS can achieve
a higher spectral efficiency than OSS, since the same spectrum resources are simultaneously
accessed by both the macro cell and small cell in heterogeneous cellular networks. However,
this also results in mutual interference between the macro cell and small cell, which may degrade
the quality-of-service (QoS) of heterogeneous networks.
To this end, an interference management scheme was presented in [19] for the sake of
alleviating the adverse impact of mutual interference on intended users. Moreover, macroscopic
and microscopic control schemes were proposed in [20] for the purpose of mitigating intercell
interference in heterogeneous networks. It is noted that the broadcast nature of radio propagation
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and open architecture of heterogeneous networks make legitimate wireless transmissions of
both macro cells and small cells become extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks [21].
Therefore, it is particularly important and necessary to explore the transmission security for
heterogeneous cellular networks. Differing from traditional encryption technology, which only
provides the computational security, physical-layer security (PLS) is emerging as a promising
means of guaranteeing perfect secrecy by exploiting physical characteristics of the communi-
cations medium [22], [23]. In the past decades, extensive research efforts have been devoted
to improving PLS with the aid of cooperative relaying [24]-[27], multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) [28]-[30], beamforming [31], [32], and millimeter-wave techniques [33], [34].
Until now, an increasing research attention has been paid to PLS for NOSS systems in
heterogeneous cellular networks [35]-[39]. To be specific, the PLS for large-scale non-orthogonal
multiple access networks was studied in [35] by using stochastic geometry and closed-form
expressions for the secrecy outage probability were derived for both single-antenna and multiple-
antenna scenarios. In [36], an effect of beamforming and artificial noise generation on the PLS
of large-scale spectrum sharing networks was examined in terms of an average secrecy rate
and secrecy outage probability. Later on, an access threshold based secrecy mobile association
scheme was proposed in [37] for improving the secrecy throughput of heterogeneous networks.
Moreover, the author of [38] investigated the PLS for orthogonal spectrum sharing systems with
the aid of joint multiuser scheduling and friendly jammer selection. It was found in [38] that no
extra secrecy diversity gain is achievable through the use of an opportunistic friendly jammer
selection. In addition, the PLS benefit of heterogeneous ultra-dense networks was studied in [39]
by jointly considering the caching and wireless energy harvesting. More recently, an interference-
canceled underlay spectrum-sharing (IC-USS) scheme, called IC-NOSS throughout this paper,
was proposed in [1] for the sake of enhancing the PLS of heterogeneous cellular networks, where
closed-form expressions for outage probability and intercept probability are derived.
This paper differs from [1] in the following aspects. First, we examine the secrecy outage
probability of IC-NOSS scheme in this paper, which is different from [1], where closed-form
expressions for intercept probability and outage probability are derived from a security-reliability
tradeoff (SRT) perspective. Mathematically speaking, it is more challenging to obtain a closed-
form expression for secrecy outage probability than that for the intercept probability and outage
probability. Second, this paper characterizes the secrecy diversity of IC-NOSS through an asymp-
totic secrecy outage analysis in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region, however no secrecy
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Fig. 1. A heterogeneous cellular network composed of a macro cell and a small cell in the presence of a common eavesdropper
(E).
diversity is provided in [1]. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows. First,
we derive closed-form expressions for an overall secrecy outage probability of the IC-NOSS,
interference-limited NOSS (IL-NOSS) and OSS schemes by jointly taking into account both
the macro-cell and small-cell transmissions. Second, the secrecy diversity analysis of these three
schemes is carried out by characterizing an asymptotic behavior of the secrecy outage probability
in the high SNR region. Finally, numerical results show that the overall secrecy outage probability
of IC-NOSS is substantially smaller than that of the OSS and IL-NOSS methods.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model
of spectrum-sharing heterogeneous cellular networks and introduce the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-
NOSS schemes. In Section III, closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of
these schemes are derived over Rayleigh fading channels, followed by Section IV, where the
secrecy diversity analysis is conducted. Next, numerical results and discussions are provided in
Section V. Finally, Section VI gives some concluding remarks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first describe the system model of a heterogeneous cellular network, where
a small cell coexists with a macro cell in the face of a common passive eavesdropper (E) which
is considered to silently wiretap the confidential messages of both the macro cell and small
cell. As shown in Fig. 1, in the macro cell, MBS transmits its message to a macro user (MU),
while SBS communicates with a small user (SU) in the small cell. An eavesdropper is assumed
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to tap both the MBS-MU and SBS-SU transmissions. Notice that both the MBS and SBS are
connected to a core network via fiber cables, e.g., a mobile switch center (MSC) in the global
system for mobile communication (GSM), a mobility management entity (MME) in the long
term evolution (LTE), which guarantees the real-time information exchange between MBS and
SBS. Notice that the focus of this paper is to analyze the secrecy outage probability and secrecy
diversity of a specific heterogeneous network with a single macro cell and small cell. It is not
mathematically tractable to derive closed-form secrecy outage probability for some more complex
heterogeneous networks e.g. with randomly distributed multi-antenna nodes. Our derived secrecy
outage probability expressions can be used to facilitate the secrecy performance evaluation of
such complex networks through Monte-Carlo simulations. Moreover, the aforementioned system
model of Fig. 1 is also applicable to a general heterogeneous network consisting of multiple
MBSs and SBSs with the aid of base station pairing and grouping. If more than one MBS-SBS
pair is available, we may divide the given spectrum into multiple orthogonal sub-bands to be
assigned to different MBS-SBS pairs.
The macro cell and small cell are allowed to share the same spectrum band, and both the
OSS and NOSS mechanisms are considered for the heterogeneous cellular network of Fig. 1. In
the OSS scheme, the spectrum band is first divided into orthogonal sub-bands, which are then
allocated to the macro cell and small cell, respectively. In this way, no mutual interference occurs
between the macro cell and small cell. By contrast, in the NOSS mechanism, MBS and SBS
simultaneously transmit their respective confidential messages over the same spectrum band.
This can enhance the spectral efficiency, which, however, comes at the cost of degrading the
QoS of transmissions, since mutual interference between the macro cell and small cell happens
in this case.
In order to guarantee the QoS of heterogeneous cellular networks, transmit powers of MBS
and SBS, denoted by PM and PS , respectively, are constrained in the conventional IL-NOSS
method for the sake of keeping the mutual interference below a tolerable level. Differing from the
IL-NOSS, the IC-NOSS scheme exploits a specially-designed signal transmitted at MBS, which
not only generates a certain interference to the eavesdropper, but can also cancel out the mutual
interference received at MU from SBS. Following the existing literature [24]-[32], the channel
coefficients of MBS-MU, MBS-SU, SBS-SU, SBS-MU, MBS-E, and SBS-E are, respectively,
represented by hMm, hMs, hSs, hSm, hMe, and hSe, which are modeled as independent Rayleigh
fading processes with respective channel gains of σ2Mm, σ
2
Ms, σ
2
Ss, σ
2
Sm, σ
2
Me, and σ
2
Se, namely
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σ2Mm = E(|hMm|2), σ2Ms = E(|hMs|2), σ2Ss = E(|hSs|2), σ2Sm = E(|hSm|2), σ2Me = E(|hMe|2),
and σ2Se = E(|hSe|2). Although only the Rayleigh fading model is considered in this paper,
similar secrecy results can be obtained for other channel models, e.g., Nakagami fading [40],
Rician fading [41], and α-µ fading [42].
According to [3] and [43], the aforementioned channel gains are modeled as σ2Mm = d
−αMm
Mm δ
2
Mm,
σ2Ms = d
−αMs
Ms δ
2
Ms, σ
2
Ss = d
−αSs
Ss δ
2
Ss, σ
2
Sm = d
−αSm
Sm δ
2
Sm, σ
2
Me = d
−αMe
Me δ
2
Me, and σ
2
Se = d
−αSe
Se δ
2
Se to
show an effect of the large-scale path loss, where dMm, dMs, dSs, dSm, dMe, dSe are transmission
distances of the MBS-MU, MBS-SU, SBS-SU, SBS-MU, MBS-E, SBS-E channels, respectively,
and, moreover, αMm, αMs, αSs, αSm, αMe, and αSe are their respective path loss factors. Besides,
δ2Mm, δ
2
Ms, δ
2
Ss, δ
2
Sm, δ
2
Me, and δ
2
Se represent small-scale fading variances of the MBS-MU, MBS-
SU, SBS-SU, SBS-MU, MBS-E and SBS-E channels, respectively. Additionally, the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a zero mean and a variance of N0 is encountered at any
receiver of Fig. 1.
Specifically, in our IC-NOSS scheme, SBS transmits a signal xS to SU with a normalized
weight wS , where E(|xS|2 = 1). Meanwhile, MBS transmits its information-bearing signal
xM at a power of PM − P¯m and a specially-designed signal xm at a power of Pm, where
E(|xM |2) = E(|xm|2) = 1 and P¯m denotes an average power of the specially-designed signal
xm in the range of 0 ≤ P¯m ≤ PM . In this way, the total average transmit power of xM and xm
is constrained to PM . Hence, we can express the received signal at MU as
yICm = hMm(
√
PM − P¯mxM +
√
P¯mxm) + hSm
√
PSwSxS + nm, (1)
where nm represents an AWGN encountered at MU. In order to neutralize the interference
received at MU, the following equation
√
P¯mhMmxm +
√
PShSmwSxS = 0 should be satisfied,
from which a special signal xm and its average power P¯m as well as a normalized weight wS
are given by
xm = −|hSm|
σSm
e−jθMmxS, (2)
and
P¯m =
σ2Sm
σ2Mm
PS, (3)
and
wS =
|hMm|
σMm
e−jθSm , (4)
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where θMm and θSm are the channel phases of MBS-MU and SBS-MU, respectively. One can
observe from (2)-(4) that the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI) of hMe and hSe is
not needed, while hMm, hSm, σ2Mm, σ
2
Sm, PS and xS are required at MBS and SBS in carrying
out the design of [xm, wS]. In general, the CSIs of hMm and hSm can be obtained at MU through
channel estimation and then fed back to MBS and SBS over a multicast channel. The statistical
information of σ2Mm and σ
2
Sm may be readily estimated by accumulating the instantaneous CSIs
of hMm and hSm. Moreover, MBS and SBS are often connected to the core network (e.g., a MSC
in GSM, a MME in LTE, etc.) via fiber cables, through which the reliable information exchange
of xS and PS can be achieved between MBS and SBS. Thus, both xS and PS can be acquired
for designing xm at MBS through the core network. As discussed in [3], the message xS is
typically initiated by another user terminal of cellular networks and sent via the core network
first to SBS which then forwards to SU through its air interface. In other words, when the core
network sends xS to SBS along with the power information PS , the same copies of xS and PS
can be received and stored at MBS simultaneously. This guarantees the synchronization between
MBS and SBS and no significant amount of extra time delay incurred at MBS in obtaining
xS and PS compared to SBS, regardless of the latency of the core network. It is of particular
interest to examine the impact of channel estimation errors and feedback delay on the secrecy
performance of our IC-NOSS scheme, which is considered for future work.
From (2) and (3), an instantaneous transmit power for the special signal xm is obtained as
Pm =
|hSm|2
σ2Mm
PS. (5)
Substituting xm, P¯m and wS from (2)-(4) into (1) yields
yICm = hMm
√
PM − P¯mxM + nm,
from which the MBS-MU channel capacity relying on our IC-NOSS scheme is given by
C ICMm = log2
[
1 + (γM − γ¯m)|hMm|2
]
, (6)
where γM = PM/N0 and γ¯m = P¯m/N0. Let β denote a ratio of the SNR of small cell to the
SNR of macro cell (i.e., β = γs/γM ), called the small-to-macro ratio (SMR) for short, where
γS = PS/N0. Noting that P¯m as given by (3) should be in the range of 0 ≤ P¯m ≤ PM , we can
obtain the following inequality
0 ≤ β ≤ σ
2
Mm
σ2Sm
, (7)
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which should be satisfied such that the mutual interference can be completely canceled out at
MU. Also, the received signal at SU can be written as
yICs = hSs
√
PSwSxS + hMs(
√
PM − P¯mxM +
√
P¯mxm) + ns, (8)
where wS , P¯m and xm are given by (2)-(4), respectively. Treating xM and xm as interference,
we can obtain the SBS-SU channel capacity as
C ICSs = log2[1 +
|hSs|2γS|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMs|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1], (9)
where γm = Pm/N0. Meanwhile, the signal transmissions of MBS and SBS may be overheard
by the eavesdropper and the corresponding received signal is given by
yICe = hMe(
√
PM − P¯mxM +
√
P¯mxm) + hSe
√
PSwSxS + ne, (10)
where ne represents an AWGN encountered at the eavesdropper. It can be seen from the preceding
equation that the eavesdropper may decode the confidential signals of xM and xS with or without
the successive interference cancelation (SIC). In this paper, we assume that no SIC is adopted
by the eavesdropper for decoding xM and xS . Although the SIC can be used for improving
the achievable data rate of wiretap channel, it can also be employed by the legitimate SU for
enhancing the data rate of SBS-SU transmissions. It can be expected that the use of SIC has
a limited impact on the secrecy rate performance of our heterogeneous networks. Hence, by
treating xm and xS as interference, the MBS-E channel capacity is obtained from (10) as
C ICMe = log2[1 +
|hMe|2(γM − γ¯m)
|hMe|2γm + |hSe|2γS|hMm|2/σ2Mm + 1
]. (11)
Similarly, the SBS-E channel capacity is given by
C ICSe = log2[1 +
|hSe|2γS|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMe|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1], (12)
which completes the signal model of IC-NOSS scheme.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of the
OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. As known, when the
secrecy capacity of data transmissions denoted by Cs falls below a predefined secrecy rate Rs,
perfect secrecy is not achievable and a secrecy outage event is considered to occur in this case.
January 30, 2019 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (UNDER REVIEW) 9
Thus, the probability of occurrence of a secrecy outage event (referred to as secrecy outage
probability) can be expressed as
Pout = Pr (Cs < Rs) , (13)
where Cs and Rs represent the secrecy capacity and secrecy rate, respectively.
A. OSS Scheme
In this subsection, we analyze an overall secrecy outage probability of the macro-cell and
small-cell transmissions relying on the OSS scheme, in which the macro cell and small cell take
turns to access their shared spectrum. For notational convenience, let α denote a fraction of the
total spectrum assigned to MBS and the remaining fraction 1 − α is allocated to SBS, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Denoting the transmit powers of MBS and SBS by PM and PS , respectively, we
can obtain the channel capacity of macro-cell transmission from MBS to MU COSSMm and that of
small-cell transmission from SBS to SU COSSSs as
COSSMm = αlog2(1 + γM |hMm|2),
and
COSSSs = (1− α)log2(1 + γS|hSs|2),
where γM = PM/N0 and γS = PS/N0 are referred to as signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) of MBS
and SBS, respectively, and hMm and hSs are fading coefficients of MBS-MU and SBS-SU
channels, respectively. Also, the channel capacity of macro-cell wiretap link from MBS to E and
that of small-cell wiretap link from SBS to E are given by
COSSMe = αlog2(1 + γM |hMe|2),
and
COSSSe = (1− α)log2(1 + γS|hSe|2),
where hMe and hSe are fading coefficients of MBS-E and SBS-E channels, respectively. As a
result, the secrecy capacity of macro-cell transmissions is given by the difference between the
capacity of MBS-MU channel COSSMm and that of MBS-E wiretap channel C
OSS
Me , namely
COSSs,M =
(
COSSMm − COSSMe
)+
, (14)
January 30, 2019 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (UNDER REVIEW) 10
where (x)+ = max(x, 0). Similarly, the secrecy capacity of small-cell transmissions can be
written as
COSSs,S =
(
COSSSs − COSSSe
)+
. (15)
Using (13) and (14), we can obtain the secrecy outage probability of macro-cell transmissions
as
POSSout,M = Pr(C
OSS
s,M < R
s
M), (16)
where RsM denotes a predefined secrecy rate of the macro-cell transmission. Substituting C
OSS
s,M
from (14) into (16) yields
POSSout,M = Pr[αlog2(
1 + γM |hMm|2
1 + γM |hMe|2
) < RsM ]
= Pr(|hMm|2 < ΛM + 2
RsM
α |hMe|2),
(17)
where ΛM = (2R
s
M/α − 1)/γM . Noting that |hMm|2 and |hMe|2 are independent exponentially
distributed random variables with respective means of σ2Mm and σ
2
Me, we have
POSSout,M = 1−
σ2Mm
σ2Mm + σ
2
Me(ΛMγM + 1)
exp(− ΛM
σ2Mm
). (18)
Similarly, by letting RsS denote a secrecy rate of the small-cell transmission, the secrecy outage
probability of the small-cell SBS-SU transmission relying on the OSS scheme can be obtained
from (15) as
POSSout,S = Pr(C
OSS
s,S < R
s
S) = 1−
σ2Ss
σ2Ss + σ
2
Se(ΛSγS + 1)
exp(−ΛS
σ2Ss
), (19)
where ΛS = [2R
s
S/(1−α) − 1]/γS .
In order to show a joint effect of the individual secrecy outage probabilities of macro cell
and small cell, we define an overall secrecy outage probability as the product of the secrecy
outage probability of MBS-MU transmission and that of SBS-SU transmission. Besides the
aforementioned multiplied secrecy outage probability definition, another overall secrecy outage
probability in the normalized sum form may be given by a mean of the individual secrecy
outage probabilities. It can be observed that the normalized sum secrecy outage probability
would be dominated by the higher individual secrecy outage probability, especially when the
lower individual secrecy outage probability is continuously improved to be sufficiently small even
without degrading the higher individual one. By contrast, any improvements or degradations of
both individual secrecy outage probabilities of the MBS-MU and SBS-SU can be readily reflected
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in the multiplied secrecy outage probability. Moreover, the IC-NOSS scheme is mainly designed
to improve the MBS-MU secrecy without affecting the SBS-SU transmission, which motivates
the use of the multiplied secrecy outage probability definition in this paper. As a consequence,
an overall secrecy outage probability of the OSS scheme denoted by POSSout can be written as
POSSout = P
OSS
out,M × POSSout,S, (20)
where POSSout,M and P
OSS
out,S are given by (18) and (19), respectively.
B. IL-NOSS Scheme
This subsection presents the secrecy outage analysis of IL-NOSS scheme, where MBS and
SBS are allowed to access their shared spectrum simultaneously and mutual interference occurs
between the macro cell and small cell. To this end, certain power allocation may be employed
for the sake of limiting such mutual interference below a tolerable level. Considering that MBS
and SBS transmit their confidential information simultaneously over the same spectrum with
respective powers of PM and PS , we can obtain the MBS-MU and SBS-SU channel capacities
for the IL-NOSS scheme as
C ILMm = log2(1 +
γM |hMm|2
γS|hSm|2 + 1),
and
C ILSs = log2(1 +
γS|hSs|2
γM |hMs|2 + 1),
where hSm and hMs are fading coefficients of SBS-MU and MBS-SU channels, respectively.
Similarly, the corresponding MBS-E and SBS-E wiretap channel capacities for the IL-NOSS
scheme, denoted by C ILMe and C
IL
Se, respectively, are given by
C ILMe = log2(1 +
γM |hMe|2
γS|hSe|2 + 1),
and
C ILSe = log2(1 +
γS|hSe|2
γM |hMe|2 + 1).
As a consequence, the secrecy capacity of macro-cell and small-cell transmissions relying on
the IL-NOSS scheme can be respectively expressed as
C ILs,M =
(
C ILMm − C ILMe
)+
, (21)
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TABLE I
Parameters Values
a1 1/σ
2
Mm
b1 γSσ
2
Sm/σ
2
Mm
c1 1/σ
2
Me
d1 γSσ
2
Se/σ
2
Me
e1 ∆M
f1 γM∆M + 1
g1 [b1f1(c1 + d1)− c1d1(b1e1 + 1)]/[b1f1 − d1(b1e1 + 1)]2
h1 (b1e1 + 1)(a1f1 + c1)/(b1f1)
i1 (a1f1 + c1)/d1
j1 −d1/[b1f1 − d1(b1e1 + 1)]
k1 [a1b1(d1e1 − f1) + (a1 + b1)d1]f1/[b1f1 − d1(b1e1 + 1)]2
l1 (c1 − a1f1)/[2d1(b1e1 + 1)]
and
C ILs,S =
(
C ILSs − C ILSe
)+
, (22)
where C ILMm, C
IL
Me, C
IL
Ss and C
IL
Se are the MBS-MU, MBS-E, SBS-SU and SBS-E channel capac-
ities of IL-NOSS scheme, respectively.
From (13) and (21), the secrecy outage probability of MBS-MU transmission relying on the
IL-NOSS approach can be obtained as
P ILout,M = Pr(C
IL
s,M < R
s
M). (23)
Substituting C ILs,M from (21) into (23), we have
P ILout,M = Pr
[
|hMm|2
γS|hSm|2 + 1
< ∆M +
|hMe|2(γM∆M + 1)
γS|hSe|2 + 1
]
, (24)
where ∆M =
(
2R
s
M − 1) /γM . Using Appendix A, we can obtain a closed-form expression for
P ILout,M as
P ILout,M =

1− exp(−a1e1)×
 − g1 exp(h1)Ei(−h1)
+ k1 exp(i1)Ei(−i1) + j1
 , b1f1 6= (b1e1 + 1)d1
1− exp(−a1e1)[l1 + d1
2b1f1
+ l1i1 exp(i1)Ei(−i1)], b1f1 = (b1e1 + 1)d1
, (25)
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TABLE II
Parameters Values
a2 1/σ
2
Ss
b2 γMσ
2
Ms/σ
2
Ss
c2 1/σ
2
Se
d2 γMσ
2
Me/σ
2
Se
e2 ∆S
f2 γS∆S + 1
g2 [b2f2(c2 + d2)− c2d2(b2e2 + 1)]/[b2f2 − d2(b2e2 + 1)]2
h2 (b2e2 + 1)(a2f2 + c2)/(b2f2)
i2 (a2f2 + c2)/d2
j2 −d2/[b2f2 − d2(b2e2 + 1)]
k2 [a2b2(d2e2 − f2) + (a2 + b2)d2]f2/[b2f2 − d2(b2e2 + 1)]2
l2 (c2 − a2f2)/[2d2(b2e2 + 1)]
where Ei(x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t
dt is known as the exponential integral function and other used parameters
are specified in Table I.
Similarly, the secrecy outage probability of small-cell transmission can be obtained from (22)
as
P ILout,S = Pr(C
IL
s,S < R
s
S) = Pr
[
|hSs|2
γM |hMs|2 + 1
< ∆S +
|hSe|2(γS∆S + 1)
γM |hMe|2 + 1
]
, (26)
which can be further given by
P ILout,S =

1− exp(−a2e2)×
 − g2 exp(h2)Ei(−h2)
+ k2 exp(i2)Ei(−i2) + j2
 , b2f2 6= (b2e2 + 1)d2
1− exp(−a2e2)[l2 + d2
2b2f2
+ l2i2 exp(i2)Ei(−i2)], b2f2 = (b2e2 + 1)d2
, (27)
where the used parameters are stated in Table II. Similar to (20), an overall secrecy outage
probability of the IL-NOSS scheme is obtained as
P ILout = P
IL
out,M × P ILout,S, (28)
where P ILout,M and P
IL
out,S are the individual secrecy outage probabilities of the macro cell and
small cell as given by (25) and (27), respectively.
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C. IC-NOSS Scheme
In this subsection, we present the secrecy outage probability analysis of IC-NOSS scheme.
Using (6), (9), (11) and (12), we can obtain the secrecy capacity of MBS-MU and SBS-SU
transmissions relying on the IC-NOSS scheme as
C ICs,M =
(
C ICMm − C ICMe
)+
(29)
and
C ICs,S =
(
C ICSs − C ICSe
)+
, (30)
where C ICMm, C
IC
Me, C
IC
Ss and C
IC
Se are the MBS-MU, MBS-E, SBS-SU and SBS-E channel capac-
ities for the IC-NOSS scheme, respectively.
Using (13) and (29), we can obtain the secrecy outage probability of macro cell for the
IC-NOSS scheme as
P ICout,M = Pr
 1 + (γM − γ¯m)|hMm|2
1 +
|hMe|2(γM − γ¯m)
|hMe|2γm + |hSe|2|hMm|2σ−2MmγS + 1
< 2R
s
M
 , (31)
which is further given by
P ICout,M = Pr

(
1− 2RsM
γM
+
|hMm|2(γM − γ¯m)
γM
)
×
(
γm
γM
+
|hSe|2|hMm|2γS
σ2Mm|hMe|2γM
+
1
γM
)
<
2R
s
M (γM − γ¯m)
γ2M

. (32)
It can be observed from (32) that deriving a general closed-form expression for P ICout,M is
challenging. As a consequence, let us consider an asymptotic case with γM →∞, for which the
terms of 1−2
RsM
γM
and 1
γM
of (32) are high order infinitesimals and negligible, leading to
P ICout,M = Pr
[
|hMm|2
(
|hSm|2 + |hSe|
2|hMm|2
|hMe|2
)
<
σ2Mm2
RsM
βγM
]
, (33)
where β = γS/γM . From Appendix B, we obtain
P ICout,M =
∫ ∞
0
f(x) exp(−x)dx, (34)
where f(x) is given by
f(x) =
2R
s
M
σ2SmβγMϕxx
− φx exp(−ϕx)
∫ −φx
−ϕx
1
t2
exp(−t)dt,
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wherein ϕx =
σ2Mmσ
2
SeβγMx
2+σ2Me2
RsM
σ2Smσ
2
MeβγMx
and φx =
σ2Mmσ
2
Sex
σ2Smσ
2
Me
. Similarly, the secrecy outage probability
of small-cell transmission relying on the IC-NOSS scheme can be obtained from (30) as
P ICout,S = Pr
[ |hSs|2|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMs|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1 < ∆S +
2R
s
S |hSe|2|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMe|2(γM − γ¯m + γm) + 1
]
, (35)
wherein ∆S = (2R
s
S − 1)/γS . It is challenging to derive a general closed-form expression for
P ICout,S from the preceding equation of (35). To this end, we consider a special case with a
sufficiently small interference gain of σ2Sm  1, which is possible in practical heterogeneous
cellular systems, since a small cell may be deployed in some shadowed areas of the macro cell
e.g. in-building places, underground garages, tunnels [1]. Hence, one can obtain from (3) and
(5) that both γm and γ¯m are negligible compared to γM for the case of σ2Sm  1, from which
(35) is given by
P ICout,S = Pr
[ |hSs|2|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMs|2γM + 1 < ∆S +
2R
s
S |hSe|2|hMm|2/σ2Mm
|hMe|2γM + 1
]
. (36)
Noting |hMm|2, |hSs|2, |hMs|2, |hMe|2 and |hSe|2 are independent exponentially distributed ran-
dom variables with respective means of σ2Mm, σ
2
Ss, σ
2
Ms, σ
2
Me and σ
2
Se, we have
P ICout,S =
∫ ∞
0
g(x) exp(−x)dx, (37)
where g(x) is given by
g(x) = Pr
[ |hSs|2x
|hMs|2γM + 1 < ∆S +
|hSe|2x(∆SγS + 1)
|hMe|2γM + 1
]
. (38)
As observed from (26) and (38), one can readily obtain g(x) as
g(x) =

1− exp(−axex)×
 − gx exp(hx)Ei(−hx)
+ kx exp(ix)Ei(−ix) + jx
 , bxfx 6= (bxex + 1)dx
1− exp(−axex)[lx + dx
2bxfx
+ lxix exp(ix)Ei(−ix)], bxfx = (bxex + 1)dx
, (39)
where the parameters of ax, bx, cx, dx, ex, fx, gx, hx, ix, kx and lx are specified in Table III.
Finally, an overall secrecy outage probability of the IC-NOSS scheme is expressed as
P ICout = P
IC
out,M × P ICout,S, (40)
where P ICout,M and P
IC
out,S are given by (34) and (37), respectively.
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TABLE III
Parameters Values
ax 1/(σ
2
Ssx)
bx γMσ
2
Ms/(σ
2
Ssx)
cx 1/(σ
2
Sex)
dx γMσ
2
Me/(σ
2
Sex)
ex ∆S
fx γS∆S + 1
gx [bxfx(cx + dx)− cxdx(bxex + 1)]/[bxfx − dx(bxex + 1)]2
hx (bxex + 1)(axfx + cx)/(bxfx)
ix (axfx + cx)/dx
jx −dx/[bxfx − dx(bxex + 1)]
kx [axbx(dxex − fx) + (ax + bx)dx]fx/[bxfx − dx(bxex + 1)]2
lx (cx − axfx)/[2dx(bxex + 1)]
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY GAIN ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the secrecy diversity analysis of OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS
schemes. The secrecy diversity is used to characterize an asymptotic behavior of the secrecy
outage probability in the high SNR region, which is defined as a ratio of the logarithm of
secrecy outage probability to that of SNR, as the SNR approaches to infinity, namely
ds = − lim
γM→∞
logPout
log γM
, (41)
where Pout denotes a secrecy outage probability and γM is an SNR.
A. OSS Scheme
This subsection analyzes the secrecy diversity gain of OSS scheme, which is given by
dOSSs = − lim
γM→∞
logPOSSout
log γM
, (42)
where POSSout is the overall secrecy outage probability of OSS scheme as given by (20). Substituting
POSSout from (20) into (42) yields
dOSSs = − lim
γM→∞
log(POSSout,M · POSSout,S)
log γM
. (43)
Denoting γS = βγM and substituting POSSout,M and P
OSS
out,S from (18) and (19) into (43), we can
readily arrive at
dOSSs = 0, (44)
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which shows that a secrecy diversity gain of zero is achieved by the OSS scheme. This means
that as the SNR increases to infinity, the overall secrecy outage probability of OSS scheme
converges to a secrecy outage floor and would not be arbitrarily low.
B. IL-NOSS Scheme
In this subsection, we present the secrecy diversity analysis of IL-NOSS scheme. Similar to
(39), we can obtain the secrecy diversity of IL-NOSS scheme as
dILs = − lim
γM→∞
log(P ILout,M · P ILout,S)
log γM
, (45)
where P ILout,M and P
IL
out,S are given by (24) and (26), respectively. Denoting γS = βγM and letting
γM → ∞, we can obtain the secrecy outage probability of MBS-MU transmissions relying on
the IL-NOSS scheme from (24) as
lim
γM→∞
P ILout,M = Pr
(
|hMm|2
|hSm|2
<
2R
s
M |hMe|2
|hSe|2
)
, (46)
which is obtained by ignoring the background noise in the high SNR region. For national
convenience, let X = |hMm|
2
|hSm|2 and Y =
|hMe|2
|hSe|2 . Since |hMm|
2, |hSm|2, |hMe|2 and |hSe|2 are
independent exponentially distributed random variables with respective means of σ2Mm, σ
2
Sm,
σ2Me and σ
2
Se, the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of X and Y are obtained as
Pr (X < x) = 1− σ
2
Mm
σ2Mm + σ
2
Smx
, (47)
and
Pr (Y < y) = 1− σ
2
Me
σ2Me + σ
2
Sey
, (48)
from which the probability density function (PDF) of Y is given by
pY (y) =
σ2Seσ
2
Me
(σ2Me + σ
2
Sey)
2 . (49)
By using (47) and (49), (46) is obtained as
lim
γM→∞
P ILout,M =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− σ
2
Mm
σ2Sm2
RsMy + σ2Mm
)
σ2Seσ
2
Me
(σ2Me + σ
2
Sey)
2dy, (50)
which converges to a non-zero secrecy outage probability floor, implying
lim
γM→∞
log(P ILout,M)
log γM
= 0. (51)
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Similarly, a secrecy outage probability floor also happens for the small-cell transmission for
γM →∞, namely
lim
γM→∞
log(P ILout,S)
log γM
= 0. (52)
As a consequence, by substituting (51) and (52) into (45), the secrecy diversity gain of the
IL-NOSS scheme can be readily obtained as
dILs = 0, (53)
which implies that the overall secrecy outage probability of IL-NOSS scheme would not decrease
to be arbitrarily small, as the SNR γM increases to infinity.
C. IC-NOSS scheme
This subsection presents the secrecy diversity analysis of IC-NOSS scheme. Similar to (45),
we can obtain the secrecy diversity of IC-NOSS scheme as
dICs = − lim
γM→∞
log(P ICout,M · P ICout,S)
log γM
, (54)
where P ICout,M and P
IC
out,S are given by (33) and (35), respectively. From Appendix C, we can
obtain lower and upper bounds of P ICout,M as
P ICout,M ≥
2R
s
M ln(γM)
8σ2SmβγM
, (55)
and
P ICout,M ≤
2R
s
M ln(γM)
2σ2SmβγM
, (56)
for γM →∞.
To verify the effectiveness of our derived lower and upper bounds of the secrecy outage
probability as given by (55) and (56), we show some numerical secrecy outage comparisons of
macro-cell transmissions for the IC-NOSS scheme in Fig. 2. It is pointed out that the theoretical
secrecy outage probability curve of Fig. 2 is plotted by using (34) and the corresponding
simulated result is obtained through the Monte-Carlo simulation of (32). Moreover, in Fig. 2, a
smaller fading gain of σ2Sm = 0.2 is considered for an interference channel from a small cell to
macro cell, which is due to the fact that the small cell is typically deployed in a shadowed area
e.g. in-building places of the macro cell. One can observe from Fig. 2 that the theoretical and
simulated secrecy outage probabilities match well with each other, demonstrating the correctness
of our secrecy outage analysis. Fig. 2 also shows that both the theoretical and simulated secrecy
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Fig. 2. Comparisons among the secrecy outage probability of macro-cell transmissions P ICout,M as well as its lower and upper
bounds versus SNR γM for the IC-NOSS scheme with RsM = 1bit/s/Hz, σ
2
Mm = σ
2
Me = σ
2
Se = 1, σ
2
Sm = 0.2, α = 0.5, and
β = 0.5.
outage probability results fall between the lower and upper bounds in the high SNR region,
validating the effectiveness of our derived lower and upper bounds of (55) and (56) for γM →∞.
As implied from (55) and (56), the secrecy outage probability of macro-cell transmission for
the IC-NOSS scheme P ICzero,M behaves as
ln(γM )
γM
, as the SNR γM increases to infinity, namely
− 1 ≤ lim
γM→∞
logP ICout,M
log γM
≤ −1,
which leads to
lim
γM→∞
logP ICout,M
log γM
= −1. (57)
Additionally, one can observe from (35) that P ICout,S converges to a secrecy outage probability
floor for γM →∞, implying
lim
γM→∞
logP ICout,S
log γM
= 0. (58)
Substituting (57) and (58) into (54) yields
dICs = 1, (59)
which shows that a secrecy diversity gain of one is achieved by the IC-NOSS scheme. This
means that given a sufficiently high SNR of γM , an arbitrarily small overall secrecy outage
January 30, 2019 DRAFT
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS (UNDER REVIEW) 20
70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
SNR γM (dB)
O
ve
ra
ll s
ec
re
cy
 o
ut
ag
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
OSS (theoretical)
OSS (simulated)
IL−NOSS (theoretical)
IL−NOSS (simulated)
IC−NOSS (theoretical)
IC−NOSS (simulated)
Fig. 3. Overall secrecy outage probability versus SNR γM of the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes.
probability can be obtained by the IC-NOSS scheme, showing its advantage over the OSS and
IL-NOSS methods.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical secrecy outage comparisons among the OSS, IL-NOSS
and IC-NOSS schemes. In our numerical evaluation, we consider the transmission distances of
dMm = dMs = dSm = dMe = dSe = 300m, unless otherwise stated. Since a small cell usually has
a much narrower coverage than a macro cell, a distance of dSs = 30m is used for the SBS-SU
transmission. Also, the path loss factors of αMm = αSs = αMe = αSe = 2.5 are used, while a
higher path loss factor of αMs = αSm = 3 is assumed for the cross-interference channels between
the macro cell and small cell, considering that the small cell is often deployed in a shadowed area
e.g. in-building places of the macro cell. Moreover, all the receivers of MU, SU and E are assumed
to experience the same small-scale fading gain of δ2Mm = δ
2
Ss = δ
2
Ms = δ
2
Sm = δ
2
Me = δ
2
Se = 1.
Additionally, an SNR of γM = 100dB, a secrecy data rata of RsM = R
s
S = 1bit/s/Hz, α = 0.5,
and an SMR of β = 0.5 are assumed, unless otherwise mentioned.
Fig. 3 shows the overall secrecy outage probability versus SNR γM for the OSS, IL-NOSS
and IC-NOSS schemes, where both the theoretical and simulated secrecy outage probabilities are
given. To be specific, theoretical secrecy outage curves of Fig. 3 are plotted by using (20), (28)
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Fig. 4. Overall secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate of the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes.
and (40), whereas simulated secrecy outage results are obtained through Mento-Carlo simulations.
As seen from Fig. 3, the theoretical and simulated secrecy outage results of OSS and IL-NOSS
match well with each other. It can also be observed from Fig. 3 that as the SNR increases, the
secrecy outage probabilities of OSS and IL-NOSS schemes gradually converges to respective
secrecy outage floors, whereas the overall secrecy outage probability of IC-NOSS scheme always
decreases significantly. The occurrence of secrecy outage floors for OSS and IL-NOSS is resulted
from the dominant effect of mutual interference in the high SNR region, which is, however,
compensated and alleviated by using a specially-designed signal of xm as given by (2) in the
IC-NOSS scheme. Furthermore, the secrecy outage performance of IC-NOSS scheme is slightly
worse than that of IL-NOSS method in the low SNR region. This is because that the specially-
designed signal used to cancel out the interference received at the macro cell consumes an
extra transmit power, which dominates the secrecy outage degradation when the transmit power
resource is very limited in the low SNR region.
Fig. 4 shows the overall secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rates of RsM and R
s
S for
the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that the theoretical and
simulated secrecy outage probabilities of OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes match well
with each other, which further validates our secrecy outage probability analysis. Fig. 4 also
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Fig. 5. Normalized sum secrecy outage probability versus SNR γM of the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes, where the
normalized sum secrecy outage probability is given by a mean of individual secrecy outage probabilities of the small cell and
macro cell.
demonstrates that as the secrecy rates of RsM and R
s
S increase, the secrecy outage probabilities
of OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes increase accordingly. Moreover, the overall secrecy
outage probability of IC-NOSS scheme is always lower than that of the OSS and IL-NOSS
methods, showing the secrecy outage benefit achieved by IC-NOSS compared with OSS and
IL-NOSS.
In Fig. 5, we show the normalized sum secrecy outage probability versus SNR γM of the
OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes, where the normalized sum secrecy outage probability is
defined as a mean of individual secrecy outage probabilities of the small cell and macro cell. As
shown from Fig. 5, the IC-NOSS scheme notably outperforms the OSS and IL-NOSS methods
in terms of the normalized sum secrecy outage probability. Moreover, as the SNR increases, the
secrecy outage advantage of IC-NOSS over OSS and IL-NOSS becomes more significant. Fig.
6 further demonstrates the normalized sum secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate of the
OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes. It can be observed from Fig. 6 that the normalized sum
secrecy outage probability of IC-NOSS is substantially lower than that of OSS and IL-NOSS
across the whole region of secrecy rate. This also validates the effectiveness of exploiting the
interference cancelation mechanism adopted in the IC-NOSS scheme against the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 6. Normalized sum secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate of the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes, where
the normalized sum secrecy outage probability is given by a mean of individual secrecy outage probabilities of the small cell
and macro cell.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the secrecy outage performance for a heterogeneous cellular net-
work consisting of a macro cell and a small cell in the presence of a common eavesdropper,
which attempts to tap confidential transmissions of both the macro cell and small cell. We
derived closed-form expressions for an overall secrecy outage probability of OSS, IL-NOSS
and IC-NOSS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. Moreover, an asymptotic secrecy outage
probability analysis was carried out for the OSS, IL-NOSS and IC-NOSS schemes to characterize
their secrecy diversity gains. It was shown that the IC-NOSS scheme achieves a secrecy diversity
gain of one, however the OSS and IL-NOSS methods obtain the same secrecy diversity gain
of zero only. Numerical results also demonstrated that the IC-NOSS scheme generally performs
better than the OSS and IL-NOSS methods in terms of the overall secrecy outage probability,
especially with an increasing SNR.
It is pointed out that in the IC-NOSS scheme, a specially-designed signal was employed
for canceling out the interference received at the macro cell as well as for confusing the
eavesdropper, which, however, consumes extra transmit power resources that could be used
for transmitting an information-bearing signal. An interesting extension is thus to explore the
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power allocation between the specially-designed signal and information-bearing signal for the
sake of minimizing the secrecy outage probability. Also, this paper only considered a specific
heterogeneous cellular network with a single macro cell and small cell, which can be extended
to a general scenario consisting of multiple MBSs and SBSs with the aid of base station pairing
and grouping. Moreover, the perfect CSI knowledge was assumed to be available in carrying out
the design of interference cancelation mechanism. It is of particular interest to further examine
the impact of channel estimation errors and feedback delay on the secrecy performance of our
IC-NOSS scheme, which is left for future work.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (25)
Denoting U = |hMm|
2
γS |hSm|2+1 and V =
|hMe|2
γS |hSe|2+1 , we can rewrite P
IL
out,M from (24) as
P ILout,M = Pr[U < ∆M + (γM∆M + 1)V ]. (A.1)
Noting that |hMm|2 and |hSm|2 are independent exponentially distributed random variables with
respective means of σ2Mm and σ
2
Sm, we can obtain a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
U as
Pr(U < u) = 1− σ
2
Mm
γSσ2Smu+ σ
2
Mm
exp(− u
σ2Mm
), (A.2)
for u > 0. Meanwhile, since |hMe|2 and |hSe|2 are independent exponentially distributed random
variables with respective means of σ2Me and σ
2
Se, the CDF of V can be given by
Pr(V < v) = 1− σ
2
Me
γSσ2Sev + σ
2
Me
exp(− v
σ2Me
), (A.3)
from which its probability density function (PDF) is obtained as
pV (v) = [
γSσ
2
Meσ
2
Se
(γSσ2Sev + σ
2
Me)
2 +
1
γSσ2Sev + σ
2
Me
] exp(− v
σ2Me
). (A.4)
Substituting (A.2) and (A.4) into (A.1) yields
P ILout,M =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− σ
2
Mm
[∆M + (γM∆M + 1)v]γSσ2Sm + σ
2
Mm
exp[−∆M + (γM∆M + 1)v
σ2Mm
]
)
×
(
γSσ
2
Meσ
2
Se
(vγSσ2Se + σ
2
Me)
2 +
1
vγSσ2Se + σ
2
Me
)
exp(− v
σ2Me
)dv
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− 1
b1(e1 + f1v) + 1
exp[−a1(e1 + f1v)]
)(
d1
(d1v + 1)
2 +
c1
d1v + 1
)
exp(−c1v)dv,
(A.5)
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where the used parameters are specified in Table I. Using (3.352) and (3.353) of [44], we can
obtain P ILout,M from (A.5) as
P ILout,M = 1− exp(−a1e1)[−g1 exp(h1)Ei(−h1) + k1 exp(i1)Ei(−i1) + j1], (A.6)
for the case of b1f1 6= (b1e1 + 1)d1. Besides, using (3.353) of [44], we arrive at
P ILout,M = 1− exp(−a1e1)[l1 +
d1
2b1f1
+ l1i1 exp(i1)Ei(−i1)], (A.7)
for b1f1 = (b1e1 + 1)d1. Finally, combining (A.6) and (A.7) yields (13).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (34)
Denoting X = |hMm|
2
σ2Mm
, Y = γM |hSm|2, Z = |hSe|2|hMe|2 , we can rewrite (33) as
P ICout,M = Pr
(
Y + σ2MmγMXZ <
2R
s
M
βX
)
. (B.1)
Since |hMe|2 and |hSe|2 are independent exponentially distributed random variables with respec-
tive means of σ2Me and σ
2
Se, a CDF of Z is obtained as
Pr (Z < z) = Pr(
|hSe|2
|hMe|2 < z) =
σ2Mez
σ2Se + σ
2
Mez
, (B.2)
from which its PDF is given by
pZ(z) =
σ2Meσ
2
Se
(σ2Se + σ
2
Mez)
2 . (B.3)
Using (B.3) and noting |hMm|2 and |hSm|2 are independent exponentially distributed random
variables with respective means of σ2Mm and σ
2
Sm, we have
P ICout,M =
∫ ∞
0
f(x) exp(−x)dx, (B.4)
where f(x) is given by
f(x) =
∫ 2RsM
σ2
Mm
βγMx
2
0
σ2Meσ
2
Se
(σ2Se + σ
2
Mez)
2 [1− exp(−
2R
s
M
σ2SmβγMx
+
σ2Mmxz
σ2Sm
)]dz. (B.5)
Letting z = − σ2Sm
σ2Mmx
t− σ2Se
σ2Me
, we can rewrite (B.5) as
f(x) =
2R
s
M
σ2SmβγMϕxx
− φx exp(−ϕx)
∫ −φx
−ϕx
1
t2
exp(−t)dt, (B.6)
wherein ϕx =
σ2Mmσ
2
SeβγMx
2+σ2Me2
RsM
σ2Smσ
2
MeβγMx
and φx =
σ2Mmσ
2
Sex
σ2Smσ
2
Me
. Combining (B.4) and (B.6) gives (34).
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APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF (55) AND (56)
Using (33) and letting X ′ = |hMm|2, Y ′ = |hSm|2, and Z = |hSe|2/|hMe|2, we have
P ICout,M = Pr
[
X ′(Y ′ +X ′Z) <
σ2Mm2
RsM
βγM
]
, (C.1)
where β = γS/γM . It is pointed out that X ′ and Y ′ are independent exponentially distributed
random variables with respective means of σ2Mm and σ
2
Sm. Moreover, the PDF of Z denoted by
pZ(z) is given by (B.3). Considering an inequality of Y ′ + X ′Z ≤ 2 max(Y ′, X ′Z), we obtain
a lower bound on P ICout,M as
P ICout,M ≥ Pr
[
2X ′max(Y ′, X ′Z) <
σ2Mm2
RsM
βγM
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P IC,lowout,M
, (C.2)
from which the lower bound P IC,lowout,M is given by
P IC,lowout,M = Pr
(
X ′2Z <
δM
γM
, Y ′ < X ′Z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
+ Pr
(
X ′Y ′ <
δM
γM
, Y ′ > X ′Z
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
, (C.3)
where δM = σ2Mm2
RsM/(2β). From (C.3), we have
P1 = Pr
(
Y ′
Z
< X ′, X ′ <
√
δM
γMZ
)
=
∫ ∞
0
pZ(z)f1(z)dz, (C.4)
where pZ(z) is the PDF of Z as shown in (B.3) and f1(z) is given by
f1(z) =
∫ √ δMz
γM
0
1
σ2Sm
exp(− y
σ2Sm
)dy
∫ √ δM
γMz
y
z
1
σ2Mm
exp(− x
σ2Mm
)dx
=
σ2Mmz
σ2Mmz + σ
2
Sm
[1− exp(−λM − λS)]− exp(−λM)[1− exp(−λS)],
(C.5)
where λM = 1σ2Mm
√
δM
γMz
and λS = 1σ2Sm
√
δMz
γM
. It can be observed that both λM and λS approach
to zero for γM →∞. Using the Taylor series expansion and ignoring the high order infinitesimal,
we arrive at
1− exp(−λM − λS) = λM + λS − 1
2
(λM + λS)
2
=
σ2Mmz + σ
2
Sm
σ2Mmz
λS − 1
2
(
σ2Mmz + σ
2
Sm
σ2Mmz
)2λ2S,
(C.6)
where the second equation is obtained by using λM + λS =
σ2Mmz+σ
2
Sm
σ2Mmz
λS . Similarly, we have
exp(−λM) = 1− λM , (C.7)
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and
1− exp(−λS) = λS − 1
2
λ2S, (C.8)
for γM →∞. Substituting (C.6)-(C.8) into (C.5) yields
f1(z) = −1
2
σ2Sm
σ2Mmz
λ2S + λMλS −
1
2
λMλ
2
S, (C.9)
for γM →∞. Since λMλ2S is a higher-order infinitesimal than λ2S and λMλS , we can ignore the
term of (C.9) and obtain
f1(z) =
δM
2σ2Mmσ
2
SmγM
, (C.10)
which is obtained by using λM = 1σ2Mm
√
δM
γMz
and λS = 1σ2Sm
√
δMz
γM
. Substituting δM =
σ2Mm2
RsM
2β
and (C.10) into (C.4) gives
P1 =
2R
s
M
4σ2SmβγM
, (C.11)
for γM →∞. Moreover, from (C.3), P2 is obtained as
P2 = Pr
(
X ′Z < Y ′, Y ′ <
δM
γMX ′
)
=
∫ ∞
0
pZ(z)f2(z)dz, (C.12)
where f2(z) is given by
f2(z) =
∫ √ δM
γMz
0
1
σ2Mm
exp(− x
σ2Mm
)dx
∫ δM
γMx
xz
1
σ2Sm
exp(− y
σ2Sm
)dy
=
∫ 1
0
λM [exp(−λM t− λSt)− exp(−λM t− λS
t
)]dt
(C.13)
wherein λM = 1σ2Mm
√
δM
γMz
. Denoting λS = 1σ2Sm
√
δMz
γM
and substituting x = σ2MmλM t, we can
rewrite (C.13) as
f2(z) =
∫ 1
0
λM exp(−λM t− λSt)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2,1(z)
−
∫ 1
0
λM exp(−λM t− λS
t
)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2,2(z)
,
(C.14)
from which f2,1(z) is given by
f2,1(z) =
λM
λM + λS
[1− exp(−λS − λM)]. (C.15)
Combining (C.6) and (C.15) and ignoring the high-order infinitesimal yield
f2,1(z) = λM , (C.16)
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for γM →∞. Besides, using t = λSx , we can obtain f2,2(z) from (C.14) as
f2,2(z) =
∫ ∞
λS
λMλS
x2
exp(−λMλS
x
− x)dx
=
∫ ∞
λS
λMλS
x2
exp(−x)dx
= λMλS[exp(−λS) 1
λS
− Ei(λS)],
(C.17)
where the second equation is obtained by ignoring the high order infinitesimal λMλS
x
for γM →∞.
Substituting exp(−λS) = 1− λS into (C.17) and ignoring high order infinitesimals yield
f2,2(z) = λM − λMλSEi(λS). (C.18)
Substituting (C.16) and (C.18) into (C.14) gives
f2(z) =
δM
σ2Smσ
2
MmγM
Ei(
1
σ2Sm
√
δMz
γM
), (C.19)
where λM = 1σ2Mm
√
δM
γMz
and λS = 1σ2Sm
√
δMz
γM
are used. Following (5.1.20) of [45], we have
1
2
exp(−x) ln(1 + 2
x
) ≤ Ei(x) ≤ exp(−x) ln(1 + 1
x
), (C.20)
for x > 0. Combining (C.19) and (C.20) yields
δM ln(γM)
4σ2Smσ
2
MmγM
≤ lim
γM→∞
f2(z) ≤ δM ln(γM)
2σ2Smσ
2
MmγM
. (C.21)
Substituting δM =
σ2Mm2
RsM
2β
and (C.21) into (C.12) gives
2R
s
M ln(γM)
8σ2SmβγM
≤ lim
γM→∞
P2 ≤ 2
RsM ln(γM)
4σ2SmβγM
. (C.22)
Combining (C.11) and (C.22) with (C.2) and (C.3) as well as ignoring high order infinitesimals,
we arrive at
P ICout,M ≥
2R
s
M ln(γM)
8σ2SmβγM
, (C.23)
which gives a lower bound of P ICout,M .
In addition, using an inequality of Y ′+X ′Z ≥ max(Y ′, X ′Z), we obtain an upper bound on
P ICout,M from (C.1) as
P ICout,M ≤ Pr
[
X ′max(Y ′, X ′Z) <
σ2Mm2
RsM
βγM
]
. (C.24)
It can be observed that only an extra coefficient of 2 is introduced in (C.2) compared to (C.24).
Thus, similar to (C.11) and (C.22), one can readily have
P ICout,M ≤
2R
s
M ln(γM)
2σ2SmβγM
, (C.25)
which is an upper bound of P ICout,M .
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